

the implications of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma.

Stalin remarked that the British had lost Burma once through reliance on Indochina. It was his opinion that the British were not dependable to protect this area. He thought Indochina was a very important area.

Roosevelt opined that the Indochinese were people of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese, and not warlike. He said France had done nothing to improve the status of the natives since it had been a French colony.

The President disclosed that De Gaulle had asked him for ships to transport French forces to Indochina. Stalin inquired where De Gaulle was going to get the troops. De Gaulle said he was going to find the troops when the President could find the ships. Roosevelt replied. Up to the present, he had been unable to find the ships.

French participation in the occupation of Germany was discussed at length in plenary sessions between the Big Three.

Churchill pressed for giving France an occupation zone which would come out of American and British sectors, in no way affecting the previously defined Soviet zone.

The Prime Minister predicted the German occupation might last a long time. He was not sure the British Government could afford the cost over an extended period; the French might be of some real assistance in this matter.

Stalin suggested this would change tripartite control of Germany into four-nation control, serving as a precedent for admitting other states.

Churchill replied that if France got an occupation zone, she would be course participate in the control machinery. As to other nations such as Belgium and Holland, there was no question of a specific zone, and thus no part in the control machinery.

Roosevelt favored an occupation zone for France, but agreed with Stalin that France should not take part in the German control machinery.

The President changed his mind later. It would be impossible to give the French an area to administer unless they were on the control commission, he said. Also, it might be easier to deal with De Gaulle if the French were represented.

Churchill brought up the question of free elections in Poland.

Stalin could see little difference between De Gaulle's position and the Lublin (Communist) Poles—neither had been elected. Yet we all dealt with De Gaulle, and the Soviet Government had concluded a treaty with him. Why was the Polish regime so different?

De Gaulle had done nothing to arouse popular enthusiasm, Stalin claimed, whereas the Polish Provisional Government had carried out a number of popular land reforms.

As to the war, France had only 8 divisions, while Yugoslavia had 12, and the Poles 13. On the basis of her contribution, Stalin said, France could not expect to get reparations from the Allies.

At a final dinner on February 10, Churchill said he faced a difficult election in England. He envied Stalin, who had to deal with only one party. Stalin admitted that one party could be a great convenience to a head of state.

Roosevelt recalled that in 1940 there had been 18 political parties in France, and within 1 week he had to deal with three different French Premiers.

Meanwhile, the American Ambassador in Paris reported to Roosevelt at Yalta the following conversation with French Foreign Minister Bidault:

"Bidault indicated clearly that the idea of a Soviet-dominated government on their frontiers fills the French with terror. Bidault stated he is trying very hard to get

along with the French Communists, particularly Thorez, who is the 'best of the lot.'"

And a London newspaper, the Daily Mail, announced in its continental edition that the United States—not Britain or Russia—was responsible for preventing De Gaulle from attending the Big Three conference at Yalta.

#### THE DE GAULLE STORY: FRANCE FINALLY GAINED EQUALITY AT POTSDAM (By Paul Martin)

WASHINGTON.—President Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt, proclaimed the end of the war in Europe on May 8, 1945.

Germany was divided into four occupation zones under the Americans, British, French, and Russians. An Allied Control Council assumed full authority over Germany on June 5. Meanwhile, the war was still going on in the Pacific.

De Gaulle's Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, came to Washington for a meeting with the new President. Truman welcomed him, expressing a desire to strengthen traditional Franco-American bonds of friendship.

Bidault said France had once been great. He hoped with American help she could be restored to her former position. Europe could not get along with only two great powers, Britain and Russia. A strong France was needed in the best interests of all.

The French Minister observed that many European questions had been decided during the war at meetings where France was not represented; he hoped France could be included in the future.

Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew said in a confidential memo to the President:

"This Government has in the past been held largely responsible by the French Government and people—and by large sections of the American people—for the absence of General de Gaulle from the Big Three meetings.

"I feel certain that this Government could take no single step which would be more appreciated by the French nation and which would do more to improve our relations with France than for you to eliminate from their minds the impression that it is the United States which is preventing their return to a status of full equality with the major Allied Powers."

Roving Ambassador Joseph E. Davies reported June 12 on a private interview with Churchill in London:

"He reviewed situations in Europe. As to France, he was bitter. He was completely fed up with De Gaulle and out of patience. He (De Gaulle) ought to be 'brought up' sharply and given to understand clearly that he cannot act arbitrarily and inconsiderately and refuse to submit his operations to the Supreme Allied Command, when his armies were supplied by his associates."

French troops had refused to withdraw from Stuttgart and northwestern Italy under orders from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander. The United States had agreed at Malta on February 1 to rearm eight French divisions, in addition to several already provided for in north Africa.

In this atmosphere, the final summit conference of the war was held July 17-August 2 at Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin in occupied Germany.

It was a much different meeting from the two at Tehran and Yalta. It was the longest conference. More was discussed, and less decided. The wartime alliance with the Communists was beginning to break up over divergent postwar aims.

Truman came armed with a host of advisers and a brisk no-nonsense attitude. Clement Attlee replaced Churchill as British Prime Minister midway in the sessions as a result of the British election. Only Stalin, as a head of state, participated in all three

conferences in their entirety. But still no De Gaulle.

The President proposed creation of a five-member council of foreign ministers to draft peace treaties and territorial settlements affecting Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

The United States, Britain, France, and Russia would decide European affairs. China would join them where questions of the Orient were concerned.

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov pointed out that France did not participate in the armistice agreements with some of these countries.

Molotov had no question that France should take part in discussions relating to Germany and Italy, but thought France should be excluded when peace treaties were considered for Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

British Foreign Secretary Eden observed that while Vichy France had not been at war with these countries, the De Gaulle movement was.

That was not the point, Molotov said, France did not participate in the armistice agreements.

Eden proposed amending the text to limit membership to those countries which had signed the armistice. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes agreed.

Stalin opposed giving reparations to France. He said France had signed an armistice with Hitler, suffered no real occupation damage, and that 150 German divisions had been transferred from France to the Russian front.

The British and Americans agreed to take care of France's reparations claims.

Bidault told the American Ambassador in Paris his government was upset over the Potsdam communique regarding reparations. Bidault later complained to Byrnes:

"France had suffered damage twice as serious as in the last war. Yet, immediately after that war, she had received 52 percent of the reparations. This time a settlement was made without her even being permitted to present any argument. It was a cruel fate."

The Potsdam Conference finally decided to include France in the Allied Control Council for Germany, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and a new reparations commission to sit in Moscow.

Ambassador Jefferson Caffery in Paris cabled President Truman that these decisions were "warmly welcomed by the French public" as evidence that "France's rightful place of equality among the great nations has at last been recognized."

#### WH (DR) *Sen. For. Rel. Feb. 1965* CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE AMERICAS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on Tuesday, both the senior Senator from Connecticut and I made reference to the first report of a special committee appointed by the Organization of American States to investigate the situation in the Dominican Republic. There was some difference of opinion as to the findings the special committee detailed in its report.

In view of this, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the pertinent excerpts relating to this first report from the introduction to a publication issued by the Internal Security Subcommittee entitled "Organization of American States, Combined Reports on Communist Subversion." I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD following that the complete text of the OAS committee's report as it

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was printed in the subcommittee's publication. I believe that this will be of general interest to Members of the Senate and anyone who may not have had an opportunity to read the full text of the report.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE AMERICAS  
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD

Because these facts have been beclouded by the rapid pace of events and by criticism at home and abroad, we have appended to this study, beginning at page 107 the first report of the Special Committee set up by the Organization of American States to investigate the situation in Santo Domingo firsthand.

The first report establishes beyond a doubt the need for prompt and decisive intervention by the United States, which is, after all, the only power of this hemisphere capable of enforcing peace quickly, efficiently, and effectively. According to the first report, the action was necessary to prevent a bloodbath in the streets of Santo Domingo.

The Special Committee notes:

"... the streets were devoid of traffic; all businesses and stores were closed, including those selling food of prime necessity. Also closed were banks and government offices, and, in general, the city's entire normal activity had come to a halt. Many refugees and other persons were in asylum in the embassies of the various American countries, and the chiefs of mission of these countries personally told us that they were concerned that there were no guarantees for the premises of their respective missions. Consequently, there was an evident lack of security and of authorities having effective control of the situation. Public services were nonexistent, including the most essential ones of water, electricity, and telephones. The atmosphere was one of tragedy, mourning, and real human anguish. Rumors and other unverifiable reports were circulated regarding bloody incidents in various parts of the city."

The Committee made the following observation on its interview with Caamaño: "The Special Committee was witness during that interview with the so-called constitutional military command to one detail that could not pass unnoticed. This was the presence of a uniformed person carrying arms, who said he was part of the command and who spoke Spanish with a pronounced foreign accent. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States interrogated him in loud voice before everyone asking him: 'Who are you? What are you doing here?' The person replied: 'I am Andre Riviere, my nationality is French, I fought in the French Army in Indochina, and I am working in Santo Domingo. I have joined this command.' While he took no part in the conversations, Riviere was in the discussion room during the time of the interview, and the authority with which he gave orders to the guards posted at the windows and the door where we were was quite obvious."

The first report also explains in detail the activities and discussions of the Special Committee with the various groups and individuals involved in the Dominican drama. The report clearly shows that the United States had to act in the interests of the Dominican people, in the interests of preventing the spread of communism in Latin America, and in the interests of its own security.

FIRST REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN STATES

(Submitted at the Fourth Plenary Session (closed) held on May 7 and 8, 1965)

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 1965, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics adopted a resolution establishing a special committee, composed of representatives of five member states: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama, for the purpose and with the powers set forth by the resolution in the following terms [the Tenth Meeting of Consultation]:

2. Instructs the Committee to go immediately to the city of Santo Domingo, to do everything possible to obtain the reestablishment of peace and normal conditions, and to give priority to the following two functions:

(a) To offer its good offices to the Dominican armed groups and political groups and to diplomatic representatives for the purpose of obtaining urgently: (1) A cease-fire; and (2) the orderly evacuation of the persons who have taken asylum in the embassies and of all foreign citizens who desire to leave the Dominican Republic; and

(b) To carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this meeting;

3. Requests the Committee to submit a report to the Meeting on the progress of its work, including the conclusions and recommendations that it may consider appropriate, in the shortest time possible;

4. Requests the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the committee; \* \* \*

The Special Committee referred to in the resolution of May 1, 1965, quoted in part above, was made up as follows:

Members

Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of Argentina.

Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho, Representative of Brazil.

Ambassador Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, Representative of Colombia.

Ambassador Carlos García Bauer, Representative of Guatemala.

Ambassador Frank Morrice, Jr., Representative of Panama.

Civilian advisers

Dr. Federico Carlos Bartfeld, Argentina.

Mr. Régis Novaes de Oliveira, Brazil.

Mr. Judio Mérida, Guatemala.

Mr. Miguel Corro, Panama.

Military advisers

Col. Juan Giró Tapper, Argentina.

Col. Lannes de Souza Caminha, Brazil.

Maj. Gen. César A. Cabrera, Colombia.

Maj. Federico Abundio Maldonado, Guatemala.

Col. Francisco Aued, Panama.

Secretariat

Dr. Roberto E. Quirós, Adviser of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

Mr. Miguel Aranguren, Director, Department of Public Information.

Mr. Modesto Lucero, Secretary.

Mr. Jorge Zamorano, Assistant.

Mr. Criando García, Assistant.

In accordance with the aforementioned resolution of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and in view of the urgency of the situa-

tion in Santo Domingo, the Special Committee decided to install itself immediately and unanimously elected as its Chairman Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of Argentina. The Committee also decided to depart for the capital of the Dominican Republic that same night, in order to lose no time in beginning its difficult work. It therefore left Washington, D.C., at 5 a.m. on Sunday, May 2.

II. THE SITUATION IN SANTO DOMINGO

From the moment it arrived in Santo Domingo, the Special Committee was deeply moved and saddened at the sight of this city on a war footing. The streets were devoid of traffic; all businesses and stores were closed, including those selling foods of prime necessity. Also closed were banks and government offices, and, in general, the city's entire normal activity had come to a halt. Many refugees and other persons were in asylum in the embassies of the various American countries, and the chiefs of mission of these countries personally told us that they were concerned that there were no guarantees for the premises of their respective missions. Consequently, there was an evident lack of security and of authorities having effective control of the situation. Public services were nonexistent, including the most essential ones of water, electricity, and telephones. The atmosphere was one of tragedy, mourning, and real human anguish. Rumors and other unverifiable reports were circulated regarding bloody incidents in various parts of the city.

The Special Committee set up its center of activities and its secretariat in the Hotel Embajador, and early Sunday afternoon, May 2, it began to make contact with the diplomatic corps and the various authorities and military commands existing in the capital, in order to obtain more precise information on what had happened and to achieve a cease-fire.

III. A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE

The special committee unanimously decided to lose no time in taking steps to obtain a cease-fire and to comply with the objectives of its mission set forth in the resolution of May 1, 1965.

According to telephone conversations between the Secretary General of the Organization and the Pan American Union, as reported in document OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1812 (English) of April 30, 1965, the Papal Nuncio, dean of the diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo, Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, was in contact with many leaders of all factions. He had spoken to Colonel Benoit of the Dominican armed forces, headquartered in San Isidro, and with Colonel Caamaño, chief of the "Comando Militar Constitucionalista"; with other groups in the new city, with Mr. José Rafael Molina Urusúa, and with Mr. Juan Bosch, the latter in Puerto Rico.

The dean of the diplomatic corps acted promptly on the anxious request of the Council of the Organization, contained in its cable of April 29, 1965 [OEA/Ser.G/VI/C/INF-571 (English)], which read:

"To His Excellency Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nuncio, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Santo Domingo:

"Deeply disturbed by the intense struggle that has desolated the sister Dominican Republic and desirous of preventing a further shedding of blood, the Council of the Organization has instructed me to convey to you, as dean of the diplomatic corps in that capital, and through you to the diplomatic representatives of the American Republics, to the Dominican authorities, to the political parties of whatever tendency, and to the



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Dominican people, its strong desire that all armed action or hostilities be suspended.

"The Council has requested me to make this humanitarian message known, in the assurance that it will be possible for the Dominican people to decide their national destinies in peace and with the protection of the institutions of the Inter-American System. I request that, in view of the urgent circumstances, you advise me as soon as possible regarding the situation in the country and the prospects for achieving an immediate cease-fire, for the purpose of informing the Council of the Organization, which remains attentive to the development of events.

"Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration."

"Dr. José A. Mora,  
Secretary General of the Organization  
of American States."

On April 30, a preliminary cease-fire agreement between the two conflicting factions was negotiated by the Papal Nuncio, dean of the diplomatic corps, on the following terms:

"1. [That] assurance is given to save the lives of all persons, regardless of their ideology or of the faction they are defending, including prisoners and asylees.

"2. That an Organization of American States Commission shall agree to serve as arbitrator in the conflict" [OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1312 (English)].

Nevertheless, in spite of this preliminary agreement signed by the two conflicting factions, the situation on the afternoon of May 2 continued very serious in the Dominican capital.

This was the judgment of the Special Committee, and it was shared by the dean of the diplomatic corps and by the Ambassadors and Chargés D'affaires of the American states Santo Domingo. No one in that tortured city had any doubt whatsoever that it was essential to conclude another agreement, more comprehensive than the earlier cease-fire agreement. The action of the Special Committee was hopefully anticipated and willingly accepted by all who had been awaiting our arrival.

The Special Committee thus lost no time in making contact with the two conflicting factions, the one in the New City and the one headquartered in San Isidro. This was extremely difficult because of the complete lack of communications in the city and because the Committee had no guarantee of safety in its travel through the streets. Consequently, it had to use a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter to go to San Isidro and then ask the dean of the diplomatic corps to take the Committee in his car to the New City, where it met with the command then headed by Col. Francisco Caamaño. These interviews took place on Monday, May 3; it was physically impossible to hold them on Sunday night, because in addition to the lack of transportation, the capital city had no telephone service, and the interviews had to be conducted by emissaries of each of the factions of the strife-ridden city.

#### IV. CONFERENCES WITH BOTH SIDES

On Monday morning, May 3, the members of the Special Committee went with the dean of the diplomatic corps in his car to the general headquarters of the forces under the command of Col. Francisco Caamaño in the New City.

All the Committee members and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States attended the conference. Attending for the command were Col. Francisco Caamaño, Dr. Héctor Aristy, Lt. Col. R. Augusto Giménez Herrera, and other individuals, who, with the ones named, claimed to represent the "Comando Militar Constitucionalista." The conference began at 11 a.m. and was held in the place designated by that

command. The meeting was held in a tense atmosphere, and continual firing could be heard through the windows.

The Special Committee explained its terms of reference as set forth in the resolution of May 1, 1965, adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and, manifesting intense concern for the Dominican people, it said that it was absolutely necessary to reaffirm the initial cease-fire, which had been agreed to but only incompletely carried out.

Dr. Héctor Aristy explained the position of the command, making the following principal points:

(a) The command headed by Col. Francisco Caamaño complained that it had not been consulted regarding the establishment in the city of Santo Domingo of a zone guarded by the Armed Forces of the United States.

(b) This command believed that the Armed Forces of the United States were constantly expanding this zone and penetrating the city further and further.

(c) The command believed, according to Dr. Héctor Aristy's own words, that "General Wessin's troops and those of the CEFA (Training Center of the Dominican Armed Forces) are entering the city close behind the American troops."

(d) The command attributed the incidents that had occurred in the last few days to snipers of General Wessin's forces.

(e) Above all, the command wanted a clarification and a guarantee regarding the zone occupied by the Armed Forces of the United States.

The Special Committee immediately made the following explanation to Colonel Caamaño and to his spokesman:

(a) The zone guarded by the Armed Forces of the United States was the same as the one referred to in the resolution adopted by the Council of the Organization on April 30, 1965 [OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1310 (English)], and had the purpose defined in paragraph 2 thereof, which reads as follows:

"To make an urgent appeal to the same authorities, political groupings, and forces on both sides to permit the immediate establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge, encompassing the geographic area of the city of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments, the inviolability of which will be respected by all opposing forces and within which nationals of all countries will be given safe haven."

(b) The aim of the Special Committee was to come to agree with the interested parties on a precise demarcation of the zone, including therein all the diplomatic missions, in order to prevent incidents due to ignorance of its boundaries.

As spokesman for Col. Francisco Caamaño and his command, Dr. Héctor Aristy, raised the question of the establishment of an access or communications corridor between the zone and the San Isidro sector, which cut the command's forces into two parts. Indeed, on the night of May 2, the Armed Forces of the United States had felt it necessary to establish a communications route, using San Juan and Teniente Amado García Streets up to the right bridgehead of Juan Pablo Duarte Bridge, for the purpose, they said, of transporting food, medicine, and provisions from the base at San Isidro to the center of the city.

The Special Committee explained to Dr. Héctor Aristy the reasons that, in their understanding, existed for the establishment of that communications route. Dr. Héctor Aristy said that the command he represented wanted the corridor or communications route, if maintained, to be under the supervision of a military police guard made up of men from its own forces and from U.S. forces. On behalf of the command, he ex-

pressed the wish that if this proposal were not accepted, then the U.S. Armed Forces should place no personnel other than military police there.

This request regarding supervision of the corridor or access route was also transmitted by the Special Committee to the Ambassador of the United States.

Finally, during the course of this conference on the morning of May 3, Dr. Héctor Aristy, as spokesman for the command headed by Col. Francisco Caamaño, made a specific request: That in no event should the new cease-fire agreement or any other agreement sponsored by the Special Committee be signed on behalf of the military junta led by Colonel Benoit with headquarters at San Isidro by any of the following seven generals:

1. Gen. Elías Wessin y Wessin.
2. Gen. de los Cantos Céspedes.
3. Gen. Belisario Peguero Guerrero.
4. Gen. Salvador Augusto Montez Guerrero.
5. Gen. Atila Luna.
6. Gen. Marco Anibal Rivera Cuesta.
7. Comodoro Rivera Caminero.

The command headed by Col. Francisco Caamaño emphatically and specifically excluded General Wessin y Wessin from any understanding whatsoever.

In the course of the interview Col. Francisco Caamaño and his companions furnished additional information. The forces of this command had taken 500 prisoners of the combat forces of General Wessin y Wessin. These prisoners were mainly soldiers and police agents, some of whom, according to Colonel Caamaño, wanted to fight in his own units. He had opposed this in order that it might not be said that it was on his orders, adding that if the Organization of American States wished to take charge of those prisoners he would accede to that. He also reported that the same units had captured 21 tanks during the course of the fighting in the city of Santo Domingo that occurred on the preceding days.

Three additional questions were cleared up during this interview with Colonel Caamaño: the acceptance by that command of complete protection to the embassies, with enlargement of the safety zone sufficiently to include the premises of the diplomatic missions in the city of Santo Domingo; similar acceptance of the departure of the asylees or refugees in the various embassies of that city who wished to leave by their own decision; and of the facilities of every kind that should be agreed upon for the Special Committee and the International Red Cross for the distribution of food and medicine and the installation of hospital equipment for the Dominican people without distinction of any kind.

The Special Committee was witness during that interview with the so-called Constitutional Military Command to one detail that could not pass unnoticed. This was the presence of a uniformed person carrying arms, who said he was part of the command and who spoke Spanish with a pronounced foreign accent. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States interrogated him in a loud voice before everyone, asking him: "Who are you? What are you doing here?" The person replied: "I am André Rivière; my nationality is French; I fought in the French Army in Indochina; and I am working in Santo Domingo. I have joined this command." While he took no part in the conversations, Rivière was in the discussion room during the time of the interview, and the authority with which he gave orders to the guards posted at the windows and the door where we were was quite obvious. Some information obtained later regarding this soldier was to the effect that he was an instructor of frogmen who had ar-

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rived at San Domingo during the Trujillo regime.

The interview ended with the promise by Col. Francisco Caamaño and his companions to accept the mediation of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and by the Committee that it would maintain the contacts to reach a specific cease-fire agreement after learning the conditions and reasons of the Military Junta of Colonel Benoit.

Meanwhile the situation in the capital was becoming more acute and threatening as the afternoon wore on. From both parties reports reached the Committee regarding incidents that each attributed to its adversary, and the chiefs of mission of the embassies accredited in Santo Domingo were becoming anxious for prompt ratification of the cease-fire. All of this gave a decisive character to these conversations.

The Special Committee, for physical reasons of communication with the San Isidro base, was unable to get as far as the headquarters of the Military Junta headed by Col. Pedro Bartolomé Benoit until the night of Monday, May 3. That night the Special Committee and the Military Junta held a conference, attended on the part of the Junta by its members: Col. Pedro Bartolomé Benoit, president of the Junta, Col. Enrique A. Casado Saladin, and Navy Capt. Olgo M. Santana Carrasco. During the last part of the interview, Gen. Wessin y Wessin was present, at the request of the committee.

The Special Committee, in the presence of the dean of the diplomatic corps and of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, opened the interview in the same way and in the same terms as those used with the command of Colonel Caamaño; that is, by reference to the resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation and to the concern caused to it by the state of the strife in Santo Domingo.

The Military Junta directed by Colonel Benoit is installed at the base of San Isidro, where at the time of our interview a considerable part of the U.S. military force also was located.

Throughout the interview its president, Colonel Benoit, spoke on behalf of the Military Junta, while his two companions remained silent. No other officer or person except the members of the Junta was present.

Colonel Benoit spoke at length of the happenings that befell the Junta of Government, presided over by Mr. Donald Reid Cabral, and told how the insurrection of April 24 had been suddenly shifted from its initial objectives to degenerate into the most complete anarchy. The initial authors of the military coup against Mr. Reid Cabral lost control of the movement and were without authority and without power of any kind. Therefore, Colonel Benoit stated, the movement that was aimed at restoring former President Bosch or, failing this, Dr. Rafael Molina Ureña to power had failed, but that what remained was a situation fraught with danger and that demanded a prompt solution.

Colonel Benoit likewise said he had not wished to order an attack on the city of Santo Domingo, where the forces commanded by Colonel Caamaño were located, out of respect for the lives of innumerable persons, but that he had enough forces to do so. In the same manner, he stated that the junta he headed accepted the security zone, with expansion of it so as to include all the diplomatic missions; the measures essential for the protection of those missions in Santo Domingo with the extension of that zone; and, likewise, cooperation in the distribution of food and medicine and the establishment of health teams.

The Special Committee endeavored to ascertain whether it was true that the action

of U.S. military forces in Dominican territory had been requested. To this end, during the interview held on the night of Monday, May 3, it requested any information on the matter that Colonel Benoit or the members of the junta that he headed could supply.

Colonel Benoit explained that the deterioration of public order in the city of Santo Domingo, which started on the day that the movement against Mr. Reid Cabral began, and the conditions of anarchy and complete disorder that prevailed in the capital of the country had led him to request the aid of U.S. Armed Forces in order to give protection to the diplomatic missions and foreign persons and entities in general. Colonel Benoit added that he had received an urgent request from the diplomatic missions for protection that he was not able to provide.

Colonel Benoit also stated that the request had been made to the United States in a note, a copy of which was transmitted later to the Special Committee, which read literally and in full, as follows:

*"Seal of the Dominican Republic, Dominican Republic, Dominican Air Force, Office of the Chief of Staff, Base Aérea '19 de Noviembre,' San Isidro, Distrito Nacional"*

"APRIL 28, 1965.

"THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES,  
"U.S. Embassy,

"Santo Domingo.

"DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Regarding my earlier request I wish to add that American lives are in danger and conditions of public disorder make it impossible to provide adequate protection. I therefore ask you for temporary intervention and assistance in restoring order in this country.

"Truly yours,

"PEDRO BARTOLOME BENOIT.

*"Colonel, Presidente de la Junta Militar del Gobierno de la República Dominicana."*

The result of this interview was a promise made by the Military Junta, composed of Colonel Benoit, Col. Casado Saladin, and Navy Capt. Santana Carrasco, to accept the authority of the Special Committee, primarily for the essential and undelayable purpose of obtaining a cease-fire.

The Special Committee informed Colonel Benoit and the persons accompanying him of the decision of the other side, that is, Colonel Caamaño's command, not to enter into any agreement in which the seven generals mentioned earlier in this report participated in any manner whatsoever.

#### V. RATIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE

In accordance with the resolution adopted on May 1, 1965, by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and on the basis of conversations held with the two factions involved in the conflict, the Special Committee made a careful study of the conditions under which a new agreement supplementary to that of April 3, might be reached, for ratifying and expanding the cease-fire.

To this end, it convoked the authorized representatives of the two conflicting factions for the purpose of informing them of a draft agreement prepared by the Committee, whose principal points were as follows:

(a) Acceptance of an act that would expressly ratify the cease-fire agreement signed on April 30, 1965.

(b) Acceptance of a safety zone marked off within the limits that would be indicated in a map officially agreed to by both parties and appended to that act.

(c) Respect for the safety zone and a guarantee of adequate protection for any persons within that zone.

(d) Facilities needed by the International Red Cross, or the international agency designated by the Organization of American

States, for the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and hospital equipment for the Dominican people.

(e) Guarantees for the evacuation of asylees in the foreign embassies or diplomatic missions in Santo Domingo.

(f) Respect for the diplomatic missions, their staffs, and for any persons who have taken refuge or asylum in those missions.

(g) Full and explicit recognition of the competence of the Special Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

In order to prepare the fulfillment of the agreement—as soon as the conflicting parties consented thereto—the Special Committee, through the dean of the diplomatic corps, convoked the chiefs of missions for the purpose of asking them which of them were interested in obtaining the evacuation of asylees or refugees. This meeting took place in the Papal Nunciature on Tuesday, May 4, around noon. The Special Committee received an oral report from the chiefs of missions on this matter. The committee informed the members of the diplomatic corps of the conversations held with the two parties on this matter, and of the mandate it had received from the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and requested them to provide a list of their asylees and refugees in order to help solve the problem of the evacuees. As a result of the action of the Special Committee, several embassies began to make arrangements for the departure of refugees and asylees who wished to leave under the guarantee of the Organization of American States. At the same time, the Special Committee was informed of the imminent arrival of hospital teams, medicine, and food supplies that had been requested, as an aircraft had arrived from Colombia on May 5. We understand that many asylees and refugees who were at the Colombian Embassy in Santo Domingo left for that country on the same aircraft.

Moreover, the Special Committee requested the military advisers of each of its members to make a reconnaissance visit to the safety zone and to arrange with the military authorities of the United States in Santo Domingo the details of the expansion of that zone to include all the embassies. This task was completed and the military advisers immediately began to prepare and draw up an official map.

Likewise, in order to prepare all the measures for the application of the cease-fire, the Special Committee informed the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the urgent need for obtaining a shipment of food, medicine, and medical personnel immediately. The following cable was sent for the same purpose:

SANTO DOMINGO,  
May 3, 1965.

Ambassador GUILLERMO SEVILLA SACASA,  
President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, Washington, D.C.

Number One.

The Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation wishes to extend emphatically, through you, to the Tenth Meeting and to each of the member states, a most urgent appeal that cognizance be taken of the dramatic situation existing in this country because of the armed strife, and to emphasize the urgent necessity for them, within the spirit of fraternity and solidarity with the Dominican people, immediately to send foodstuffs, medicine, and medical personnel.

The Committee is convinced that this is the most urgent of the serious problems being faced, in order to prevent the possibility of epidemics and other calamities that could make the situation of the Dominican people even more difficult.

Ambassador COLOMBO,  
Chairman of the Committee.



August 26, 1965

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We have learned that the Meeting of Consultation approved a resolution on this matter, based on the humanitarian gesture of the Special Committee.

VI. REPORTS TO THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION

On May 4, 1965, the Special Committee reported to the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation concerning the status of negotiations for agreeing upon the cease-fire and replied to a telephone message from the General Secretariat in Washington concerning various aspects of its labors.

The cablegram from the Special Committee to the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation mentioned above reads:

SANTO DOMINGO,  
May 4, 1965.

"Ambassador GUILLERMO SEVILLA SACASA,  
President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, Washington, D.C.

"Number Two.

"Replying telephone communications received today, I wish to report the following:

"First: All contacts have been made with groups represented by the following persons: Constitutional Military Command: Col. Francisco Caamaño, Lt. Col. Manuel Montes Arache, Maj. Héctor E. Lachapelle Díaz, Mr. Héctor Aristy, Maj. Fabio C. Restano, Lt. Col. Augusto Jiménez, and Lt. Col. Pedro Álvarez Olguín. Members of the Military Junta: Col. Pedro Bartolomé Benoit, President; Col. Enrique A. Casado; Navy Capt. Olgo Manuel Santana Carrasco, and Gen. Elías M. Wessin y Wessin, Director of the Armed Forces Training Center. Likewise, with members of the diplomatic corps, especially all those of Latin America, the Papal Nuncio, and the Ambassador of the United States.

"Second: Committee, in addition to interviews mentioned above, has been in constant touch with the aforesaid groups, and at present, the Committee is awaiting the formalization of the points that have already been accepted by both parties, which are: Confirmation cease-fire, demarcation and enlargement of security zone to include all embassies, evacuation of asylees and refugees, and distribution of food, medicine, and medical equipment to all sectors of the population without regard to parties. We have thus far encountered a good attitude on the part of both parties.

"Third: Committee will return as soon as it obtains the results of the negotiations it is conducting. Possibly tomorrow.

"Fourth: Both parties have accepted the enlargement of the security zone to include all Latin American embassies and we are working to fix a boundary for it. U.S. forces established an access corridor between San Isidro and the security zone.

"Fifth: We consider that it would be useful, in order to aid in bringing a return of the Dominican situation to normality, for the member states that are in a position to do so to establish a combined inter-American military force under the Organization of American States to achieve the objectives that are set by the Meeting of Consultation.

"Sixth: With reference to the question by the Ambassador of Colombia, the only airport capable of receiving planes is the one at the San Isidro airbase, which is under the authority of the Military Junta presided over by Colonel Benoit.

"Ambassador COLOMBO,  
Chairman of the Committee."

VII. ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO

As a result of the conversations held by the Committee with the parties an agreement was finally reached referring to the points covered in this report.

The text of the document known as the

"Act of Santo Domingo," signed on May 5, 1965, is as follows:

"Act of Santo Domingo"

"The Parties signing below who declare that they represent, in the capacities mentioned, respectively, the Military Junta of Government and the 'Constitutional Government' hereby place on record that they have reached the following agreement as a result of the discussions held with the two Parties by the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, whose members also sign the present Act as a guaranty of its compliance and execution, functions that both Parties agree the Committee may carry out.

"1. The Parties who sign the present Act ratify the cease-fire agreement signed on April 30 last.

"2. The Parties accept the establishment of a safety zone in the city of Santo Domingo, demarcated within the boundaries indicated on the map attached to this document and signed by the same Parties who sign the present Act.

"3. The Parties bind themselves especially to respect this safety zone, within which there is guaranteed, in the manner that the Organization of American States may deem appropriate, adequate protection and safety for all persons found within that zone of refuge.

"4. The Parties undertake to give all necessary facilities to the International Red Cross or to the international agency that the Organization of American States may designate to carry out in any part of the city of Santo Domingo or of the Dominican Republic the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and hospital equipment that are being sent as a result of the appeal made by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They also undertake to provide all facilities required by the Organization of American States so that medical and sanitary personnel sent by the governments can be transported to any point in the city of Santo Domingo or Dominican territory, to perform their services.

"5. The Parties undertake to provide all necessary safety measures for the evacuation of asylees in foreign embassies or diplomatic missions who so request of them.

"6. The Parties undertake to respect the diplomatic missions and to offer all cooperation necessary to guarantee the safety of all personnel of those missions and of asylees or refugees therein.

"7. The Parties declare that they accept and recognize the full competence of the Special Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for purposes of the faithful observance of what is agreed to in this Agreement.

"In witness whereof the present document, which shall be known as the Act of Santo Domingo, is signed in four original copies, of which one shall be deposited in the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, one shall be for each of the Parties, and one shall be for the files of the Committee.

"The Secretary General of the Organization of American States shall transmit certified copies to each of the member states."

"MAY 5, 1965."

"For the Military Junta of Government:

"Colonel PEDRO BARTOLOMÉ BENOIT,

"Dominican Armed Forces.

Colonel ENRIQUE A. CASADO SALADIN,

National Army,

Captain OLGO N. SANTANA CARRASCO,

Navy."

"For the Constitutional Government:

"Colonel FRANCISCO CAAMAÑO DEÑO,

Constitutional President.

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. R. AUGUSTO

JIMÉNEZ HERRERA,

Colonel RAMÓN MANUEL MONTES,

Major HÉCTOR ACHAPELL,

Dr. HÉCTOR ARISTY,

Minister of the Presidency."

"For the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States:

"Ambassador RICARDO COLOMBO,

Representative of Argentina, Chairman  
of the Committee.

Ambassador ILMAR PENNA MARINHO,

Representative of Brazil.

Ambassador ALFREDO VAZQUEZ CARRIZOSA,

Representative of Colombia.

Ambassador CARLOS GARCÍA BAUER,

Representative of Guatemala.

Ambassador FRANK MORRICE, Jr.,

Representative of Panama.

VIII. EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH THE  
UNITED STATES

Before reaching an agreement with the conflicting parties concerning the ratification and expansion of the cease-fire, the Special Committee studied the question relating to the cooperation of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Dominican Republic with the Committee within the objectives indicated by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation in the resolution of May 1, 1965.

On the night of May 3 the Special Committee had an interview with the Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador of the United States to the Dominican Republic. The results of this interview and the precise opinion of the Special Committee were set forth in a memorandum delivered personally to that diplomatic representative, which read as follows:

"Memorandum

"As a result of the meeting that was held on the night of May 3, 1965, the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, has the honor to state the following to the Ambassador of the United States to the Dominican Republic:

"1. The Committee has had the steadfast purpose of attaining the confirmation and effectiveness of the cease-fire agreement already agreed upon.

"2. To achieve this end, the Committee has today held long conversations with the commanders of the command headed by Colonel Caamaño and of the military junta headed by Colonel Benoit. Both have given their consent to participate jointly with the Committee in formal negotiations, for the purpose of arriving at a supplementary and amplifying agreement on the cease-fire, which the Committee believes indispensable and which should include among its principal clauses, in addition to others:

"(a) The demarcation and enlargement of the safety zone to include the embassies that are present outside this zone.

"(b) The cooperation of both parties with a Committee of the Organization of American States for supervising and applying the cease-fire.

"(c) Cooperation for humanitarian aid.

"d. Departure from the country of Dominican refugees or asylees in the embassies who wish to leave.

"3. The Committee would like to know whether, in the event that a supplementary and amplifying agreement of this nature can be signed by both parties, the U.S. military forces in the Dominican Republic could receive precise instructions for cooperating in carrying out the agreement.

"4. The Committee feels that without the essential cooperation of the United States, the aforementioned agreement could not be carried out.

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"5. The Committee believes that the foregoing corresponds to the terms of its instructions contained in the resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Meeting of Consultation, especially with what is stated in paragraph 2.a, concerning the cease-fire, and the content of paragraph 4, which states: [The Tenth Meeting of Consultation:] 'requests the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee.'"

After the Act of Santo Domingo was signed, by which the cease-fire of April 30, 1965, was ratified and amplified, the Special Committee sent to the Ambassador of the United States in the Dominican Republic a note in which it expressly requested the cooperation of the Government of that country in applying the stipulations of that document. The note from the Special Committee and the reply from the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, are transcribed below:

"SANTO DOMINGO,

"May 5, 1965.

"The Honorable W. TAPLEY BENNETT,  
"Ambassador of the United States of America to the Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo de Guzman, Dominican Republic.

"SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you, Sir, under instructions of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, a certified copy of the Act of Santo Domingo signed today by the parties who entitle themselves, respectively, 'military Junta of Government' and 'Constitutional Government.'

"As item 4 of the resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation requests the American Governments to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee, this Committee hopes that your Government will cooperate with it in observing the stipulations of the Act of Santo Domingo.

"Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

"RICARDO M. COLOMBO,

"Representative of Argentina,  
"Chairman of the Committee."

WASHINGTON,

May 7, 1965.

His Excellency DR. RICARDO M. COLOMBO,  
Representative of Argentina on the Council of the Organization of American States.

EXCELLENCY: I have been advised by the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic of Your Excellency's communication to him of May 5, transmitting a certified copy of the "Act of Santo Domingo" and expressing the hope that the United States Government will cooperate in its observance. Since the Commission has now returned to Washington, I am taking the liberty of replying directly to you.

I have the honor to express my Government's gratitude for and support of the work of the Commission in Santo Domingo. The United States will cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions of the Act of Santo Domingo. I do not have before me the map attached to the Act of Santo Domingo, but I assume that the boundaries of the International Safety Zone coincide with those that now exist and that the line of communication crossing the Duarte Bridge as it now exists is shown on the map.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

DEAN RUSK,

The Secretary of State.

#### IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In presenting this report to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Special Committee has desired only to give an account of its activities from May 1 to 5, 1965, that is, during the visit to the city of Santo Domingo.

The Special Committee, achieved, under truly dramatic circumstances, the main objectives set forth in the previously mentioned resolution with respect to cease-fire, the orderly evacuation of persons who have taken asylum or refuge, and humanitarian assistance to the Dominican people without any distinction as to parties or conflicting factors. The Special Committee also achieved the demarcation of a safety zone in the city of Santo Domingo in accordance with the map officially drawn up by its military advisers. This map was transmitted to both parties, and the original is at the disposal of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

As the representatives will note, the Act of Santo Domingo and the results thus far obtained by the Special Committee constitute the first stage of a process of restoring peace and normality in the Dominican Republic, which requires the Inter-American System to take several steps toward consolidation.

Among the measures we believe could be adopted at once by the 10th Meeting of Consultation, we suggest the following:

1. Designation of a permanent technical military group in the city of Santo Domingo to supervise the cease-fire and other measures agreed upon by the parties in the Act of Santo Domingo.

2. Designation of another qualified group to organize humanitarian aid to the Dominican people and evaluation of the most urgent needs with regard to food, medicine, and hospital equipment.

3. Study and planning of the Inter-American Force created by the Resolution of May 6, 1965, of the 10th Meeting of Consultation, in order to assure it the best conditions of operation and efficiency.

4. To empower the Special Commission to establish coordination among all these elements and activities in the Dominican Republic in order to attain the goals set forth in the resolutions approved by the 10th Meeting of Consultation.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 7, 1965.

RICARDO M. COLOMBO,

Ambassador of Argentina, Chairman.

ILMAR PENNA MARINHO,

Ambassador of Brazil.

ALFREDO VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA,

Ambassador of Colombia.

CARLOS GARCÍA BAUER,

Ambassador of Guatemala.

HUMBERTO CALAMARI G.,

Ambassador of Panama.

#### EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAWS TO ASSIST IN SAFEGUARDING THE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY of New York in the chair), laid before the Senate the amendments of the House of Representatives to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 5280) to provide for exemptions from the antitrust laws to assist in safeguarding the balance-of-payments position of the United States, which were, on page 2, line 4, of the Senate engrossed amendment, after "payments" insert "position", and on page 2, line 19, of the Senate engrossed amendment, after "program" insert "is taken until after such voluntary agreement or program".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House to the amend-

ment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 5280).

The motion was agreed to.

#### THE LESS VISIBLE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. JAVITS. The world and the people of South Vietnam are not as aware as they should be of our determination to wage the less visible war against poverty and despair in that country. Unfortunately much of the good work of our aid program—the basic counterinsurgency effort and the other important work on the political and economic level—has been obscured and overshadowed by the smoke of battle.

I feel that we must make sure that the people of South Vietnam themselves are aware of the fact that we are as determined to aid in the fulfillment of this social revolution for their benefit, as we are to halt Vietcong military aggression; that we are determined not to allow the Communists to capture this revolution, with their hypocritical and fraudulent espousal of its objectives, only as a means of collaring a trusting people into eternal slavery.

We must underline once again our determination to help the people of South Vietnam retain their independence, and also to make that independence meaningful. We must again and again remind ourselves and the world that our military efforts are not an end in themselves, but only the means of helping the Vietnamese people to achieve their legitimate aspirations.

Press reports out of Washington the last few days indicate that there is an "air of optimism" in official thinking about the Vietnam situation. The thinking seems to be that the words of our highest officials, the deeds of the Marines on Chu Lai peninsula last week and the other actions of the U.S. Armed Forces have made it plain to the Vietcong, and their North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese supporters that we are determined not to bow to aggression. This determination, so runs this line of thinking, may well compel the Communist side to actively explore the possibility of negotiating peace.

Certainly I hope that these reports are correct and that we are closer to ending the fighting in South Vietnam. However, I feel that those who express this optimism over the situation in Vietnam are failing to take into full account the less-visible war, the legitimate social and economic revolution. As a matter of fact, to benefit from any cease fire or peace settlement, the Government of South Vietnam, working with its own citizens, and with our help, must successfully wage this war on economic and political inadequacies and failures to secure the confidence of all the Vietnamese people.

This social revolution is critically important. By propaganda, by terror, and by political action the Vietcong have sought to turn this revolutionary spirit into the cutting edge of their own war against the people of South Vietnam. The highest officials of our Government